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The Department of Defense (DoD) has begun the revolution in business affairs by 
renewing initiatives for outsourcing as a means to meet an estimated $60 billion shortfall 
for force modernization. The Marine Corps has projected outsourcing to achieve $110 
million in annual savings by FY 2004. The Commander, Marine Forces Pacific 
(MARFORP AC) has designed and is implementing a Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) to 
save approximately $38 million annually by FY 2004. OMB Circular A-76 provides 
guidance for· outsourcing commercial activities. This thesis examines previous DoD 
experience with outsourcing and the MARFORP AC CRI to determine the lessons learned 
that may be integrated during implementation of the CRI. This study analyzed 
outsourcing efforts of other services and developed criteria that may be applied to 
contracting out services throughout the Marine Corps. Lessons learned include the 
development of an accurate performance work statement; the use of multifunction studies 
to provide increased savings compared to several single function studies; the use of best 
value criteria and a performance-based contract to increase the probability for successful 
contract awards; command commitment to outsourcing is a key ingredient at the local 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has begun the revolution in business affairs as 
a result of recommendations by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 
realization that to achieve the goals of Joint Vision 2010 DoD must do things differently. 
Since the end of the Cold War, DoD has experienced declining budgets and an increasing 
requirement to do more. Since the mid 1980's, DoD has reduced procurement spending 
by approximately 69%, personnel by 32%, and the overall budget by 35% (Cohen, 1997 
and DoD Report, 1996). DoD infrastructure costs continue to absorb a substantial part of 
the overall DoD budget even though the number of bases have been reduced as a result of 
the Base Closure and Realignment and'Commission (BRAC). DoD officials have begun 
to look for additional internal ways to save money through infrastructure consolidation 
and streamlining support functions. (DSB, 1996) 
B. RE-EMERGENCE OF OUTSOURCING 
Due to recent deficit reduction efforts and competing national priorities for 
dwindling discretionary funds, defense planners have reassessed the value of outsourcing 
as a means of reducing infrastructure costs. Numerous studies have looked at potential 
savings that DoD can achieve as a result of outsourcing. Recent experience with 
outsourcing indicates that DoD can reduce infrastructure costs by approximately 30 
percent. (DoD Report, 1996) The Defense Science Board estimates that DoD can realize 
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savings of $7 - $12 billion by fiscal year (FY) 2002 depending on how aggressive all the 
services are in outsourcing (DSB, 1996). 
The current DoD initiative has been inspired by the fact that savings that result 
from outsourcing will not be taken out of future years budgets but can be reprogrammed 
to modernize the force. The anticipated savings from outsourcing will also enable DoD 
to sustain/maintain the readiness of the force. (DoD Report, 1996) 
Federal agencies have been utilizing the private sector for providing 
services/commercial activiti~s since the mid 1950's. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) established the federal policy for outsourcing/contracting out with OMB 
Circular A-76. Over the years, the A-76 process has resulted in cost savings and 
efficiencies. 
1. The Marine Corps Perspective 
The Marine Corps' current budget plan has incorporated a $34 million investment 
in OMB Circular A-76 studies over the next three years. These studies will determine 
which functions are eligible for competition. The Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) for the Marine Corps reflects a $20 million competition savings 'ramp'/wedge for 
FY-1999. This wedge will increase over the next six years to $110 million by FY-2004. 
"The wedge was built on assumed savings gained through the competition of all available 
base commercial activities" (USMC, 1998a). The Marine Corps like the other services, is 
looking for ways to save Operations and Maintenance (O&MMC) costs that can then be 
reprogrammed to procurement and modernization of existing systems. 
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The Marine Corps has emphasized the need to maintain its core warfighting 
capabilities. As a result, the Marine Corps is focusing outsourcing efforts on 
outsourcing/competitive sourcing on infrastructurelbase commercial activities to generate 
savings. These savings will be invested in the modernization and procurement accounts. 
(USMC, 1998b) The goal is to reduce the non-core functions performed by the 
supporting establishment. 
2. Marine Forces Pacific Strategic Plan 
The Commander, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) has established a 
proactive Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) that is intended to meet the assigned wedge to 
MARFORP AC. The CRI will employ many methodologies to meet the wedge assigned. 
The CRI is designed to meet the wedge and also provide savings that MARFORP AC can 
reinvest in its own short fall areas. 
The CRI relies on competition from the A-76 process and a program called "Cost 
Saver". This plan is expected to provide the savings called for in the 'wedge' and more to 
allow for internal reinvestment. 
C. AREA OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the cost reduction initiative adopted by MARFORP AC as 
the Marine Corps and DoD attempt to meet the challenge of reducing infrastructure costs 
while maintaining readiness in an era of reduced resources. 
1. Primary Question 
The primary questions addressed in this thesis are: (a) What is the Marine Corps 
policy on outsourcing, (b) what are the lessons learned from commands that have 
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completed the outsourcing process, and (c) is the strategy developed by the 
Commander, Marine Forces Pacific adequate to achieve the savings that have been 
identified by HQMC. 
2. Secondary Question 
In answering the primary question,· the following 
secondary questions will be addressed: 
1. What is the definition of outsourcing? 
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of outsourcing? 
3. Why does the Marine Corps need to outsource? 
4. Why does the Commander, Marine Forces Pacific need to outsource? 
5. What are some of the issues that will affect the Commander, Marine Forces 
Pacific during the outsourcing process? 
6. What types of impact can the Marine Corps and Commander, Marine Forces 
Pacific anticipate as a result of outsourcing? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will focus primarily on one major component of the Marine Corps, 
MARFORP AC. MARFORP AC is headquartered in Hawaii and maintains bases in the 
United States and overseas. This thesis will: 
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1. explore the outsourcing initiative developed by MARFORPAC; 
2. identify possible problem areas that may arise as a result of the cost 
reduction initiative; 
3. identify concerns with the outsourcing process based on opinions of 
personnel involved with the process; 
4. compare the MARFORPAC initiative with other Department of the Navy 
outsourcing initiatives. 
Because the MARFORP AC plan is in its initial stages, a cost comparison will not 
be able to be completed due to time limitations. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
A thorough review of government reports, congressional testimony, and a wide 
variety of references,was conducted to gather historical and current data. Interviews were 
conducted with the MARFORP AC Cost Reduction team to provide expert opinions on 
the process being used. 
Chapter n focuses on the background of outsourcing and specific areas related to 
DoD. Chapter ill examines the MARFORPAC CRI initiative. An analysis of other DoD 
outsourcing experiences and related lessons learned is provided in Chapter N. Chapter V 
discusses conclusions, answers the thesis questions, and provides recommendations for 
further research. 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will provide an initial assessment of the MARFORPAC CRI initiative. 
This assessment will provide MARFORP AC and other commands an overview of lessons 
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learned from other DoD outsourcing initiatives and how they will impact the 
implementation of the CRI. 
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II. BACKGROUND OF OUTSOURCING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the Eisenhower administration, the president signed a presidential 
directive stating that "the federal government will not start or carry on any commercial 
activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such a product or service can be 
procured from private enterprise" (Hanke, 1987). OMB Circular A-76 instituted a formal 
policy for commercial activities in 1966. Since that time, DoD has utilized this policy as 
a management tool to outsource commercial activities. 
The emphasis on outsourcing or competitive sourcing has increased within the 
past few years as a result of numerous studies conducted by the administration and DoD 
(GAO 96-108). These studies have indicated that substantial savings can be achieved 
through outsourcing commercial activities. During this period of fiscal constraint, DoD 
has utilized procurement and modernization accounts to fund shortfalls in the operation 
and maintenance accounts. This strategy worked initially due to the reduction in end 
strength and the relatively new age of most weapons systems. "The QDR report noted 
that while DoD had reduced active duty personnel by 32 percent between 1989 and 1997, 
it had only reduced the number of personnel performing infrastructure functions by 28 
percent" (GAO 98-122). Today, DoD faces the challenge of reinvesting in procurement 
and modernization while maintaining operations and maintenance to meet current and 
future threats. 
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B. OUTSOURCING DEFINED 
Outsourcing or contracting out has been given many definitions throughout the 
years. "DoD defines outsourcing as the transfer of functions performed in-house to 
outside providers and privatization as the transfer or sale of government assets to the 
private sector"(GAO 97-110). 
The underlying assumptions of outsourcing are that (a) the government operates 
as a monopolist and is therefore inefficient, and (b) the private sector is inherently more 
efficient because of competition in the market. Osborne and Gaebler indicate that the key 
is not public versus private, but the presence of competition. (1993, p. 79) 
This thesis focuses on outsourcing and considers outsourcing, contracting out, and 
competitive sourcing to mean the process of transferring functions that are traditionally 
done in-house to the private sector. 
The key to outsourcing is infusing competition into those functions that have been 
accomplished previously by government agencies. It is assumed that competition leads to 
increased efficiencies and savings. A recent Center for Naval Analysis study indicated 
that average savings of 30 percent could be realized from outsourcing (Tighe, 1996). 
Outsourcing in the private sector has become the model for DoD to emulate. The 
Outsourcing Institute estimates that in 1996, U.S. firms spent approximately $100 billion 
for outsourced services while saving 10 to 15 percent of total costs. In a 1995 survey, 
firms viewed outsourcing as a means to reduce costs and stay competitive. (DSB, 1996) 
The Defense Science Board also identified key outsourcing lessons learned from the 
private sector that covered management, contracting, and personnel. 
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OMB Circular A-76 is official government policy stating that Federal Agencies 
are to rely on and not compete with the private sector for goods and services. This policy 
has evolved over the years to reflect the assumption that the government should obtain 
goods and services in the most cost-effective manner. 
C. RE-EMERGENCE OF OUTSOURCING 
With the end of the Cold War DoD has experienced budget reductions that rival 
the worst of times in the past Cold War era. To maintain readiness, money was 
transferred from procurement and modernization accounts. Due to recent budget 
reductions and the balanced budget agreement, top-line defense budgets are not 
anticipated to grow significantly in the out-years. Since the mid 1980's, the defense 
budget has declined approximately 60 percent in real dollar terms. (DRI, 1996) 
As a result of this current fiscal reality, DoD has embraced outsourcing and 
privatization as a means to save money. The Commission on Roles and Missions 
(CORM) made this recommendation in its 1995 report: 
We recommend that the government in general, and the Department of 
Defense in particular, return to the basic principle that the government 
should no compete with its citizens. To this end, essentially all DoD 
"commercial activities" should be outsourced, and all new needs should be 
channeled to the private sector from the beginning. (CORM, 1995, p.3-3) 
1. Steady State Budget 
As previously stated, in FY 1997 the defense budget reflected a 60 percent decline 
in real terms form its Cold War peak in 1985. This fact, coupled with the commitment to 
reduce the federal deficit, means that DoD cannot plan on an increase in its budget. As a 
result, the recommendation of the QDR to increase modernization funding to $60 billion 
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will have to be paid by increasing internal efficiencies. These efficiencies will have to 
come from infrastructure savings. 
DoD has renewed efforts to achieve savings by utilizing the A-76 process. As a 
result of the QDR, CORM, and DSB, the Department has set an aggressive plan in 
motion to achieve savings required by the QDR. Some of the savings proposed are: 
• By 2003, DoD anticipates saving over $2 billion annually from outsourcing 
commercial activities that involve over 130,000 civilian personnel 
• The CORM recommended outsourcing or privatizing all current and newly 
established commercial type support services, which could save over $3 
billion per year. 
• The DSB recommended restructuring the DoD support structure and relying 
on the private sector. This along with the adoption of better business practices 
could save over $30 billion annually by 2002. 
• The QDR recommended cuts of 61,700 active duty personnel, 54,000 reserve 
personnel, and 60,800 civilian personnel by 2003. These cuts are expected to 
save $3.7 billion per year by 2003 (GAO 97-110 & 98-100). 
If achieved, these savings will provide resources needed to modernize the force, 
meeting the $60 billion goal. 
2. Focus on Core Competencies 
Since 1996, DoD has begun to evaluate in-house activities that do not directly 
relate to meeting national security needs. The QDR estimated that $10 to· $12 billion in 
procurement funding could be diverted for unplanned operating functions if DoD 
maintains the status quo (GAO 98-100). Expanding outsourcing of commercial activities 
will assist DoD in adjusting to a declining defense budget and a changing world 
environment while ensuring and adequate national defense. 
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Public sector core competencies may be defined as those activities that are 
inherently better done by governmental agencies than business. These are activities that, 
for legal, constitutional and other reasons would be inappropriate to relinquish 
responsibility for to a non-government source (Camm, 1996). DoD has identified three 
major areas that must be maintained to meet the security challenges of the future: 1) 
readiness; 2) quality of life; and 3) modernization. "The purpose of the departments 
initiative is to sustain or improve readiness, generate savings for modernization and 
improve the quality and efficiency of support to the warfighters" (DoD Report, 1996). By 
competing base infrastructure functions, DOD's warfighting competencies are left intact 
and perhaps strengthened. 
3. Benefits of Outsourcing 
The proponents of outsourcing cite a number of benefits. First, as noted, 
competition for services will result in greater efficiencies. These efficiencies will result 
whether a public or private enterprise conducts the activity (Tighe, 1996). 
Second, the economic benefits that result from competition translate into cost 
savings. The savings from contracting out to a private firm can be substantial because the 
private firm has a powerful incentive to seek innovative approaches to reduce costs 
(Hanke, 1987). 
a) Efficiencies 
Competition and profit incentives are far stronger efficiency tools than 
bureaucratic management tools (Fitzgerald, 1988). The outsourcing process provides 
opportunities to increase efficiency within the organization. The A-76 process provides 
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guidelines for the development of most efficient operations. The competition that results 
is presumed to drive the organization to increase efficiency. 
Outsourcing provides the government the opportunity to take advantage of 
the efficiencies of the market. Since the private sector is driven by the profit motive, the 
private sector is supposed to be more receptive to customer needs. The private sector can 
also take advantage of labor efficiencies and economies of scale. Labor efficiencies result 
from the greater flexibility private firms have in managing the work force. Economies of 
scale also result, in some instances, from the fact that a private firm can perform the same 
function at multiple sites. (Robert, Gates, & Elliot, 1997) 
Competition also leads to an increase in productivity. Numerous studies 
indicate that productivity increased as a result of A-76 reviews. The increase in 
productivity results from realizing economies of scale, utilizing improved production 
equipment and reorganizing structure and . operating procedures (Hilke, 1992). 
Competitions associated with the A-76 process force in-house activities to streamline 
their operations and cut costs below the level that existed prior to study (HASC, 1989). 
b) Cost Savings 
The primary focus of outsourcing is projected savings. The competition 
associated with outsourcing can provide alternative sources of supply, introduce cost 
visibility and better business practices. (Tighe, 1996) 
Between 1978 and 1994 DoD conducted over 2,000 A-76 competitions 
that resulted in savings of $1.5 billion (DSB, 1996). 
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Competitions Average Annual Percent 
Completed Savings ($M) Savings 
Armv 510 $ 470 27% 
Air Force 733 $ 560 36% 
Marine Corns 39 $ 23 34% 
Navv 806 $ 411 30% 
Defense A~encies 50 $ 13 28% 
Total 2138 $1478 31% 
Table 2-1. Savings Yield from Competition (DRI, 1997) 
As Table 2-1 indicates, savings were realized during these competitions, resulting 
in reduced operating costs. These savings highlight the future potential of outsourcing. 
Other studies indicate that projected savings from outsourcing can range from 20 to 40 
percent. Among actual competitions, approximately 50 percent were won by in-house 
government agencies. (GAO 97-86) The key to achieving these savings was competition 
and not the outsourcing of the activity itself. 
Based on recent studies, historical evidence and the proposed A-76 competitions 
scheduled within DoD, it is estimated that DoD can save $6 billion over the next five 
years. The goal is to achieve annual savings of $2.5 billion per year beginning in FY 
2004. (DRI, 1997) 
Competition from outsourcing provides DoD with a means to capture some of the 
benefits of the market economy regardless of who wins the competition. The resulting 
organization will be more adept at meeting the challenges of an uncertain world. The 
benefits from competition will allow DoD to better provide the nation with the military 
force needed for the 21 st century. (DRI, 1997) In the final analysis, the government is 
responsible to the taxpayer to ensure that the competitive process is managed fairly and 
cost effectively. 
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4. Outsourcing Concerns 
With any program, policy or initiative, there are advantages and disadvantages to 
be considered. Concerns with outsourcing have been raised by opponents. The following 
three are prevalent in the literature: 1) projected savings are overstated; 2) fraud and 
abuse is associated with contracting services; and 3) there is cultural resistance to this 
type of change. 
a) Projected Savings May Be Overstated 
As a result of the savings projected from outsourcing, DoD has reduced 
out year O&M budgets. Several GAO reports caution that past experience has shown that 
actual savings have fallen short of forecasted amounts (GAO 97-110, 98-86, & 98-122). 
Previous experience within DoD with reform initiatives has not resulted in 
the amount of savings initially estimated. Part of the problem is quantifying cost savings. 
This is due in part to a lack of accurate cost data within DoD and OMB. Another factor is 
the inherent inaccuracy of the DoD commercial activities database. This database 
provides operational savings that represent the difference between the cost of the in-house 
activity and the cost of the winning bid under A-76 competitions. The military 
departments (mildeps) and services track these costs for only three years. Any changes 
that occur after three years are not tracked. Many studies have forecasted savings based 
on information in this database. Consequently, the conclusions drawn with regard to the 
amount of savings that can be achieved is suspect. (GAO 97-86) 
With the potential for future budget and personnel reductions, the potential 
to achieve the proposed savings is slowly reduced. During FY 1987 through FY 1996, 
O&M budget authority declined by 25 percent in real terms and the civilian work force 
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declined by 27 percent, and it is expected to decline by 33 percent by FY 2002. (GAO 97-
86) As a result, many of the easy savings have been achieved. To maintain the current 
level of support to the force, the scope of work for contracts will have to be increased, 
thereby increasing the costs to accomplish the activity and reducing the savings realized. 
b) Fraud and Abuse Associated with Contracting 
Contractor abuse is not unique to the government. Fraud also occurs 
within the private sector. The difference is that when it is uncovered in a government 
contract, it is more visible. Contractual problems are typically the result of flaws in the 
development of the performance work statement. Congressional testimony has 
highlighted cases where contractor corruption has occurred (HGR&O, 1997). This can be 
resolved in part by establishing more clearly defined service requirements, written 
evaluation and monitoring criteria (Hanke, 1987). .Having a good and enforceable 
contract reduces the potential for abuses. 
Contractor corruption is difficult to achieve when the process meets four 
criteria: 1) bidding is competitive; 2) the competition is based inaccurate cost information 
and quality performance criteria; 3) the contract has a built in monitoring system; and 4) 
an outside party is charged with performing these tasks (Osborne and Gaebler,1993). To 
prevent abuse, the government employs a three-phase strategy: 1) utilization of accurate 
statements of work; 2) conducting random audits on contract and in-house work 
performance; and 3) contracts are recompeted if performance is substandard (HGR&O, 
1997). By adhering to this strategy, DoD is able to prevent some fraud. However, DoD 
must be ready to detect fraud when it occurs or face the wrath of Congress and the public. 
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c) Cultural Resistance to Change 
For outsourcing to be successful, the culture within DoD must change. 
The DRI established the framework for such change. The Secretary of Defense has 
established the Defense Management Council to oversee the implementation of this 
change within the Department. (DRI, 1997) 
DoD is in the process of transforming from a Cold War response 
organization into one that meets the challenges and unpredictability of the future. The 
lack of common systems and processes across the mildeps and services create problems 
in implementing change. The Defense Management Council is supposed to enforce 
greater commonality for the mildeps and services. 
To achieve success, DoD must ensure that implementation is based on 
results-oriented goals, performance measures and a realistic implementation timetable. 
The Defense Management Council must take an active role in this process and 
communicate it to the mildeps and services. This will then allow the mildeps and 
services to focus resources on higher priority programs. 
D. THE OUTSOURCING PROCESS 
The decision to outsource functions is seldom easy to make in the public or 
private sector. OMB Circular provides guidelines for agencies to determine activities that 
are commercial in nature. Commercial activities are defined as those providing a product 
or service that can be obtained from a commercial source (DoD,[4100.15], 1989). The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) has submitted many reports to Congress on OMB 
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Circular A-76. The following summary from one such report provides background 
information on the process. 
Circular A-76 and its supplemental guidance require agencies to evaluate 
their activities to determine whether they are governmental or commercial 
and complete an inventory of all commercial activities. A-76 requires, in 
certain circumstances, that agencies conduct cost comparisons to 
determine the most efficient means to carry out commercial activities. 
Under A-76, agencies are to use a three-step process to determine whether 
recurring commercial activities will be performed in-house or by 
contractors. The process consists of (1) developing a performance work 
statement that defines the technical, functional, and performance 
characteristics of the work to be performed; (2) conducting a management 
study to determine organizational structure, staffing, and operating 
procedures for the most efficient and effective in-house performance of the 
commercial activity, referred to as the Most Efficient Organization or 
MEO; and (3) accepting formal bids and conduct a cost comparison 
between the private sector and the government's Most Efficient 
Organization in order to make a decision on whether an activity will be 
performed by the government or the private sector. (GAO 98-146, pp.2-3) 
The A-76 process has resulted in savings. Some agencies report that savings 
resulted from the competition resulting from the use of the process while GAO reports 
that savings from the A-76 process were the result of reengineering the activity resulting 
in fewer personnel. It is evident that savings can be realized when agencies utilize a 
structured approach to review their procedures and to implement changes that result in a 
more efficient organization. 
Besides the savings that can result, the A-76 process also may provide an effective 
management tool to increase efficiency within the organization. A-76 gives agencies the 
ability to make more business-like decisions that lead to better performance. The A-76 
process is the vehicle that allows for competition between the public and private sectors. 
It forces public sector organizations to evaluate organizational processes and develop the 
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MEO that can provide efficiencies and cost savings. It also provides an opportunity for 
the private sector to compete against public organizations. 
The A-76 process is not without its critics. One of the major complaints with the 
process is that it is lengthy and disruptive. The reason for this stems from the fact that the 
in-house agency must develop historical data to conduct an accurate cost comparison 
while at the same time continue to conduct normal business. This puts managers and 
workers in the position of analysts, which may lead to confusion and a decrease in 
productivity. (HGR&O, 1995) The process currently averages two years to complete. 
This causes internal problems with the agency as workers feel added stress not knowing 
the status of their future employment. 
Another concern is that the process is implemented unevenly within the 
government. DoD has led all other governmental agencies in the number of cost 
comparison studies conducted since FY 1986 (HGR&O, 1997). DoD has one of the 
largest pools of federal civilian workers so there is an incentive within DoD to conduct 
A-76 studies in the hopes of realizing savings. However, even within DoD there are 
legislative restrictions on the type of activities that can be subject to the A-76 process. 
These restrictions exist because of legislation that: a) require studies and Congressional 
notification prior to converting public activities to contractors where more than 45 
civilian employees are involved; b) restricts the mildeps and services from contracting out 
firefighter and security guards; c) requires the mildeps and services to maintain a logistics 
capability sufficient to provide a timely response to mobilization or other national defense 
emergency; and d) requires the mildeps and services to submit annual reports to 
Congress.(GAO 97-110 & 98-48) These statutory and regulatory provisions act as 
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hindrances to the mildeps and services as they attempt to achieve efficiencies and reduce 
costs. Some examples of these restrictions are: 
• DoD is required to have 60 percent of all depot maintenance performed by 
federal employees. 
• The mildeps and services must determine which logistics functions are core 
• 
warfighting capabilities and maintain these under direct control. 
Firefighting and security guard functions must be performed by federal 
employees even in those areas where these functions could be performed more 
efficiently by the private sector. (DoD Report, 1996) 
As a result, DoD is forced to concentrate on those commercial activities that relate 
to supporting the force. 
E. THE MARINE CORPS PERSPECTIVE 
The Marine Corps presently faces unique challenges in managing the transition to 
the 21 st century. These challenges are manifest in the need to modernize aging weapons 
systems and facilities in all era of reduced resources. To meet these challenges, the 
Commandant has called for a, "Revolution in Business Affairs" that will drastically 
change the way the Marine Corps conducts business (CMC, 1998). The Marine Corps, 
like the other services, has sustained operations and maintenance funding at the expense 
of procurement. "Based on the most optimistic economic assumptions, and assuming the 
[Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle] AAAV enters procurement in FY 2004, the 
Marine Corps is at least $1 billion short of affording the Corps we need" (Fulford & 
Clifton). 
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As a result of the movement of funds from .investment into O&MMC accounts, 
the Marine Corps also faces a backlog of maintenance on its real property. Currently, the 
Marine Corps is investing in military construction that replaces existing facilities on a 
cycle of 200 years. (Fulford & Clifton) Clearly, this is inadequate to meet the needs of 
the Corps. In FY 1999, the backlog is expected to grow to $814 million, based on the 
current assumptions about FY 1999 budget (HNSC, 1998). The Marine Corps, like the 
other services, has been assigned its portion of the $60 billion DoD savings 'wedge'. 
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Figure 2-1. Marine Corps Savings Wedge (USMC, 1998a) 
The Marine Corps has spread the wedge over major commands and bases. As 
indicated in Figure 2-1, the Marine Corps must identify $20 million in savings by FY 
2000. Each commander is tasked with identifying functions that can be competed. 
Attaining these savings will require innovative approaches to obtain the best value for 
goods and services. To attain the efficiencies needed to support this savings effort, the 
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Marine Corps will contract out active duty Marine billets that do not affect core 
competencies and reduce end strength (USMC, 1998a). 
F. SUMMARY 
DoD must continue to reduce its infrastructure costs to increase funding for 
modernization. Outsourcing is believed to be the tool that will attain the savings needed. 
Previous experience has shown that the competition associated with the outsourcing 
process can generate savings and improve performance. 
The savings anticipated from the A-76 may not be realized. To attain the savings 
needed for modernization, the rnildeps and services must ensure that the performance 
work statements are accurate and that the statements of work accurately depict the 
services required. 
The Marine Corps has begun the long-term effort to streamline its infrastructure. 
To be successful in this endeavor, the Corps must have leaders who embrace the concept 
and are willing to 'think outside the box'. 
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III. MARFORPAC CRI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
MARFORPAC has developed and instituted the Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI) 
to meet the challenges associated with competitive sourcing. This plan distributes 
MARFORP AC's portion of the Marine Corps wedge to its major subordinate commands. 
Figure 3-1 depicts MARFORPAC's portion of the wedge. The cumulative effects of the 
wedge can be seen as MARFORP AC will 'contribute' $150 million to the Marine Corps 
savings wedge between FY 2000 to FY 2005. 
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Figure 3-1. MARFORPAC Savings Wedge (USMC, 1998a) 
The focus of the CRI is directed at the core business functions that MARFORP AC 
conducts. MARFORP AC has adopted a two pronged strategy to achieve these savings 
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because of the impact of overseas installations. For U.S. installations, the OMB Circular 
A-76 process will be the primary tool used to achieve savings. For the WESTPAC 
installations, commands will utilize the cost saver process because the government of 
Japan pays most of the base labor and utility costs. The cost saver process will also be 
used by the operating forces to realize savings and efficiencies because their functions are 
inherently governmental. (MARFORPAC, 1998c) 
Table 3-1 depicts how MARFORP AC has distributed their wedge between the 
MARFORPAC commands. The amounts shown will be withdrawn from the command's 
budget ceiling on 1 October of the fiscal years indicated. This table also indicates the 
number of commercial activity billets that each command will compete. Billet targets 
appear in the FY in which savings will be withdrawn. 
FYOO FYOI FY02· FY03 FY04 FY05 
CAMP BUTLER 
WEDGE($M) 3.2 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 
BILLET TARGETS 960 960 960 960 
IWAKUNI 
WEDGE ($M) 1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
BILLET TARGETS 290 290 290 290 
IMEF 
WEDGE ($M) 2 3 4 4.5 5 7.3 
III MEF 
WEDGE ($M) 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 4.8 
COMCABWEST 
WEDGE ($M) 0.45 1.5 3.7 4.3 4.3 4.3 
BILLET TARGETS 600 600 1300 1300 
CAMPEN 
WEDGE ($M) 1.8 3.6 4.7 5 5 5 
BILLET TARGETS 2000 2000 2000 2000 
MCB HAWAII 
WEDGE ($M) 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
BILLET TARGETS 700 700 700 
Table 3-1. MARFORP AC CRI Savings Wedge (MARFORP AC, 1998b) 
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B. THE eRI 
The CRI is a long-term program designed to meet mandated savings and 
investment requirements. This will require a cultural change within MARFORPAC as to 
how the command plans programs and budgets. This plan also requires the commitment 
of leaders at all levels of command. The Force Commander has articulated his vision to 
the force: 
U.S. Marine Forces PacificIMarine Corps Bases Pacific will be proactive in cost 
reduction efforts to support funding of force modernization and reinvestment in 
our own shortfalls. 'We will create processes and a structure to support our 
operating forces-processes and structure that work better and cost less. Our end 
state will be the savings of 10 percent based on FY99 ceilings for FY03 and the 
out years, while maintaining (or increasing) Readiness and Quality of Life. Our 
first priority will always remain to ensure that our operating forces are ready 
to fight! (MARFORP AC, 1998a) 
The CRI effort is based on the following principles established by· the Force 
Commander: 
• Meet the wedge while maintaining - or increasing- readiness and quality of 
life. 
• Mobilize, motivate and enable commanders to reduce costs and meet assigned 
wedges using a variety of cost saving tools. 
• Utilize a 'combined arms' approach to cost savings - the operating forces and 
supporting establishment will both participate in the CRI. 
• Utilize a bottom-up approach - all levels of command must participate in order 
to identify and implement the best business practices and policies. 
• Use all cost savings tools available, but focus on those primary tools tailored 
to the geographic region and organizational structure. 
• In the midst of change the philosophy of taking care of our people will not be 
abandoned. 
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• All commercial activities will be competed - this competition does not imply 
that the function will be outsourced. (MARFORPAC, 1998a) 
1. eRI Organization 
MARFORPAC has developed a four-tier organization to implement the CRI. The 
organization is made up of the CRI Executive Steering Committee (ESC), the CRI 
Working Group, the MARFORPAC G-8 Cell, and the InstallationlMEF CRI Cells. 
a) The Executive Steering Committee 
The ESC is made up of general officers representing all major commands 
within MARFORP AC. Its primary role is to provide oversight and long range guidance 
for the CRI, provide recommendations to the Force Commander, and task the Working 
Group. The ESC will also interface with the Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) 
Outsourcing and Privatization Executive Steering Committee. The Deputy Commander 
chairs the MARFORPAC ESC. (MARFORPAC, 1998a) 
b) The CRI Working Group 
The MARFORPAC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-8, chairs this group. 
Representatives include members of the MARFORP AC staff and members of the 
subordinate MEF's and installations. The Working Group's role is to develop working-
level plans and requirements and discuss issues related to on-going commercial activity 
studies. (MARFORPAC, 1998a) 
c) The MARFORPAC CRI Cell 
Members of the MARFORPAC G-8 comprise this cell. Included with the 
active duty Marines are three Industrial engineers and a civilian contractor. The CRI cell 
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will implement the approved guidance of the ESC, and provide information and 
assistance to subordinate commands. (MARFORPAC, 1998a) 
d) Installation and MEF CRI Cells 
These cells will implement the CRI at the local level. Each command is 
given flexibility to establish the cell according to the specific needs of the command. 
Each cell will be responsible for coordinating between the supporting establishment and 
the operating forces. (MARFORP AC, 1998a) 
MARFORPAC has 'also established a working relationship with the Navy 
Facilities Engineering Command (NA VF AC) to provide expertise in areas where the 
Marine Corps is lacking. These Industrial Engineers have become integral members of 
the MARFORP AC staff and provide expertise on the OMB Circular A-76 process, cost 
reduction and program analysis. Currently four have been assigned to the MARFORP AC 
CRI cell and re-named Re-Engineering Business Consultants.(RBCs) The goal is to have 
13 RBCs working with each installation and the MEFs within the year. (Fulford & 
Clifton) This CRI organizational structure is designed to effectively implement and 
monitor the CRI program. 
2. Competitive Sourcing 
The primary cost saving tool for U.S. installations will be the OMB Circular A-76 
process. Under the MARFORPAC CRI plan, the A-76 process is expected to average 24 
months to complete. The following policy statements regarding competitive sourcing 
have been published: 
• All installation billets will be considered commercial activities unless 
otherwise justified in accordance with OMB Circular A-76. 
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• All commercial activities will be competed. 
• U.S. installations shall use combined function studies to conserve resources, 
facilitate post-competition oversight and ensure strong competition. 
• WESTPAC installations shall achieve the maximum reduction in labor costs. 
• Reductions in installation military manpower costs will count towards the 
modernization wedge. 
• Personnel will be trained to effectively engage in competition. 
(MARFORPAC, 1998b) 
MARFORPAC anticipates conducting multi-function studies at its U.S. 
installations. Reductions in personnel, both military and civilian, will create challenges 
that will need to be overcome. These challenges include transition plans, sea-shore 
rotation plans and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) progression. Details of how to 
effectively meet these challenges are still being formulated. The reductions in the 
O&MMC accounts begin in FY 2000; therefore solutions to these challenges will be dealt 
with during the A-76 process. 
a) A-76 Guidebook 
MARFORPAC will utilize the Navy's Succeeding at Competition: Guide 
to Conducting Commercial Activity Studies to provide commanders with a tool to assist 
them in navigating the issues associated with the A-76 process. This guide provides a 15-
step process to complete the process in accordance with the intent and requirements of 
OMB Circular A-76. 
This guidebook outlines a process that provides detailed timelines and 
milestones so that the process can be completed within 12 months. The steps are: 
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Step 1: Plan for Commercial Activities Study 
Step 2: Develop PWS and Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) 
Step 3: Review and Revise PWS and QASP 
Step 4: Obtain Higher Level Approval of PWS and QASP 
Step 5: Conduct Pre solicitation Actions 
Step 6: Prepare and Issue Solicitation 
Step 7: Develop the Management Plan 
Step 8: Respond to Solicitation (Government/Contractor) 
Step 9: Perform Independent Review 
Step 10: Evaluate Proposals 
Step 11: Obtain Prenegotiation Clearance Approval 
Step 12: Conduct Discussions with Offerors 
Step 13: Obtain Final Clearance Approval for Best Value Contractor 
Proposal 
Step 14: Compare Government and Contractor Proposals 
Step 15: Announce Tentative Decision 
3. Other Cost Saving Initiatives 
The Cost Saver program is designed for overseas installations and the operating 
forces. The program utilizes a constructive team approach to identify, evaluate, develop 
and implement better, more efficient business practices. It focuses on streamlining and 
re-structuring organizations to achieve a 'most efficient organization'. Cost Saver is a 
four phased process consisting of: Initial Contact, Training, Development, and 
Implementation. This is a team-oriented approach that recognizes the benefits of 
employee/staff involvement. Cost Saver will focus on the following base and operating 
forces business practices: contract improvements, process improvements, developing and 
expanding business opportunities, and organizational changes. The key to the process is 
having strong leadership and the involvement of the employees. 
MARFORPAC will develop Activity Base Costing (ABC) capability as a means 
to determine the total costs associated with various activities. ABC also will be used to 
conduct functional cost analysis, develop a scorekeeping baseline and measure the 
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success of the CRI. MARFORP AC has committed $527 thousand for training in ABC. 
ABC will also be used in the Cost Saver process. (MARFORPAC, 1998c) 
Regionalization or consolidation of functions between installations also is being 
considered. This concept ranges from functions that are shared by installation in the same 
geographic area, logistics and manpower, to functions that are conducted by commands in 
different geographic locations. Interservice regionalization is also being explored. The 
goal is to eliminate redundant functions and organizations, and streamline the remaining 
functions and organizations, thereby reducing overhead costs. (MARFORP AC, 1998c) 
Adoption of better business practices also is part of the overall CRI. 
Benchmarking and modeling current practices on established and proven private 
enterprise practices will be attempted. In addition to ABC, this will include outcome-
based contracting and streamlined acquisition. (MARFORP AC, 1998c) 
4. Scorekeeping 
MARFORP AC has developed a model designed to provide accounting of 
investments, maintain an accurate record of savings achieved and support economic 
analysis. The model is based on the Standard Accounting, Budgeting and Reporting 
System (SABRS). SABRS will record funding reductions made in the same expense 
category in which savings have been identified. 
The scorekeeping model is based on funding levels as of 1 October 1998. 
Changes to the funding level as a result of congressional, DoD or service action will 
require the model to be adjusted. 
Savings that result will be applied using the following priority: funds to meet 
MARFORPAC's assigned portion of the Marine Corps modernization wedge; funds 
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allocated by the MARFORPAC ESC towards CRI investment, civilian transition, and 
installation and operating force deficiencies; and funds retained by the local commanders 
as efficiency incentives. (MARFORPAC, 1998c) 
The scorekeeping model will assess success in three parts. Part one will assess 
the changes in spending patterns of the major subordinate commands (MSC). A series of 
reviews will be conducted to evaluate actual obligations recorded in official accounting 
reports. These data will then be analyzed by the MARFORP AC CRI cell to measure 
spending changes in core functions. These data will be arrayed in the Core Business 
Model format depicted in the Appendix. The Appendix illustrates the Core Business 
Model for bases/stations and the operating forces broken out by functional area. The CRI 
cell assessment will then be compared to the savings reported by the MSCs, and 
differences will be reconciled as necessary. 
Part two will assess changes in readiness reported by the MSCs. Standard 
readiness reporting criteria will be utilized for bases/stations and the operating forces. 
Data will be analyzed to determine whether readiness has declined, remained the same or 
improved during the CRI period. 
Part three will assess changes in Quality of Life (QOL) of each of the MSCs. 
Standardized QOL indicators will be used as outlined in various directives for 
bases/stations and the operating forces. These data will be analyzed to determine trends 
in QOL and to evaluate whether QOL has declined, remained the same or increased 
during the CRI period. (MARFORP AC, 1998c) 
MARFORP AC has developed a broad-based approach to achieving the assigned 
savings. The command will· employ many cost saving measures ranging from better 
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business practices to elimination of unnecessary functions and competing all commercial 
activities. MARFORPAC has recommended to each command that all commercial 
activities be competed in a single function study as a means of conserving resources. 
While specific savings from the A-76 competitions will not be known for more than two 
years, utilizing the other cost saving measures will result in near term savings. With the 
implementation of the CRI, MARFORPAC is breaking new ground for the Marine Corps. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Each outsourcing initiative is unique and must be evaluated on a case by case 
basis due to the fact that each installation has a unique mission. When determining which 
function to outsource, many considerations impact the decision. Potential commercial 
activities may be similar across installations; but to ensure competition the functions must 
be available in the private sector. This requires the availability of alternate providers 
from which the installation may choose. 
For savings to be generated from competition, there must be a viable local market 
for that service. The more competitors in the market, the more likely it is that costs will 
be controlled over time. With more competitors in the market, the contract will continue 
to bid upon when it is recompeted, thus ensuring that the best price is paid for the service. 
Another consideration is to determine how to effectively separate functions 
without disrupting the mission of the installation. Bundling or grouping similar functions 
together can provide efficiencies and cost savings. These efficiencies arise because the 
installation only has to deal with one contractor. Cost savings occur as a result of fewer 
resources applied to conduct a cost comparison study. A drawback to bundling is that the 
installation may have to accept some inefficiency in a part of the overall contract so as not 
to put the entire contract at risk. 
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DoD has a wealth of experience in outsourcing; from building major weapons 
systems to contracting out base support services. Some experiences, both positive and 
negative are evaluated in the following section. 
B. OUTSOURCING CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies provide experiences form other services that 
MARFORP AC· can utilize when implementing the CRI. The specific functions 
outsourced may not apply to MARFORPAC; the lessons learned can provide a wealth of 
valuable knowledge. 
1. Fort Rucker 
For Rucker is the main aviation-training base for the U.S. Army. The Army has 
contracted out the maintenance of training helicopters and primary flight instruction for 
over 30 years. The aircraft maintenance contract is a cost-plus contract with incentives 
because the Army is more concerned with safety issues. The current contract is worth 
approximately $80 million and is recompeted every five years. During the last 
competition there were 15 bidders. Although different contractors have won over the 
years, the employee base has remained in place resulting in steady performance. (Tighe, 
1997) 
The pilot training contract provides instruction for 22 weeks of primary flight 
instruction. This includes classroom and flight training. The command is very satisfied 
with the quality of the output - the basic helicopter pilot. The contract allows for a 
flexible response to training requirements. The command is required to give a 60-day 
notice for an increase in instructors and 30 days when fewer instructors are needed. This 
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flexibility has not adversely impacted the contractor performance. As an example, during 
the only contract default, the iqstructors continue to work without pay for one week until 
a new contractor was chosen. (Tighe, 1997) 
The renewed emphasis on outsourcing is creating similar challenges for Fort 
Rucker as currently seen by MARFORP AC. Fort Rucker currently lacks the expertise to 
conduct A-76 cost comparison studies, create the PWS and design the MEO. Due to this 
lack of experienced personnel, the command is reluctant to initiate new A-76 studies. 
The command also faces pr~ssure from the Army chain of command to find additional 
outsourcing savings. Fort Rucker staff members have questioned whether additional 
savings can be found as a result of downsizing and fiscal constraints. (Tighe, 1997) 
2. Navy TA-4 Maintenance 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a study of the outsourcing of 
maintenance for the TA-41 Skyhawk aircraft, at Navy advanced jet training commands. 
CNA wanted to determine whether training readiness had been affected as a result of the 
switch to contract maintenance. 
CNA developed five lessons learned from their case study. The first is that there 
was a significant break-in period or learning curve associated with beginning of the initial 
contract. Performance dropped during this period. The transition period lasted four years 
and it took two years before the contractor realized any performance improvement 
compared to in-house Navy maintenance. Even with this initial degradation in 
performance, the quality of the maintenance and readiness was not adversely affected in 
the training commands. (Tighe, 1997) 
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Second, after the initial break-in period, the contractor performed as well as, or 
better than the in-house Navy maintenance. By analyzing aviation maintenance date for 
mission capable (MC) and full mission capable (FMC) rates, CNA determined that the 
contractor surpassed the in-house team. For both MC and FMC rates, it took the 
contractor 29 months before rates began to improve. (Tighe, 1997) 
Third, cost savings were sustained or increased with subsequent contracts even 
when there was a change in contractors. These savings resulted from the contractor using 
fewer resources than the in-house team. During the initial 15 months of the contract, the 
contractor had to cope with the effects of a learning curve. CNA utilized Direct 
Maintenance Man-Hours (DMMH) per flight hour to determine efficiency and that while 
DMMH rates were increasing for the contractor, they were still below the in-house team 
rates. Efficiency significantly increased even though the contractor employed fewer 
personnel. (Tighe, 1997) 
Fourth, the reason that productivity increased after the break-in period was due to 
the fact that contract employees remained in place and can take advantage of the effects 
of the learning curve. Members of the in-house Navy maintenance were rotated in and 
out of the command, which resulted in a steeper learning curve. (Tighe, 1997) 
Lastly, CNA determined that there was no break-in period or learning curve 
associated with the change of contractors. This is directly attributed to the fact that for 
the most part, contract employees remained in place. Cost reductions due to increased 
efficiencies were realized. (Tighe, 1997) 
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3. Parris Island 
This case highlights one of the few Marine Corps efforts in outsourcing and it was 
a failure. Between 1988 and 1992, two separate multifunction base operating supporting 
(BaS) contracts were in effect. The A-76 competition process leading to contract award 
lasted five years. The first contractor lasted three years before going bankrupt for reasons 
unrelated to Parris Island. The second contractor lasted 10 months before the government 
declared them in default and brought the functions back in:"house. 
The multifunction BaS contract contained functions that ranged from pest control 
to heating plant operations. ,One of the problems identified with the first BaS contract 
was that the PWS was incomplete. This led to problems in contractor performance. 
Another problem was the effect on employee morale that occurred during the five year A-
76 competition process. It took an additional year for to contract start, which 
compounded the moral, and productivity problems with civilian workers. Once the 
contract award was announced, many of the most qualified workers left. Those that 
remained were not as productive, which created an unanticipated backlog of work for the 
contractor to assume at start date. (Tighe, 1997) 
Both contracts resulted in problems with contractor use of government provided 
facilities; specifically, the steam-generation plant and the sewage treatment plant. 
Conflict arose between the government and contractors over the operation and 
maintenance of these facilities. The government maintained that the facilities were not 
being properly maintained or operated by the contractor. The first contractor claimed that 
the facilities required many improvements and upgrades which affected their ability to 
operate them. The second contractor failed to accurately document proper inventory 
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controls of spare parts for these facilities. This led to an adversarial relationship between 
the government and both contractors. In the end, all previously outsourced functions 
were brought back in-house. 
The Davis-Bacon Act and the Service Contracting Act require contractors to pay 
wages set by the Department of Labor. (DOL) At the time Parris Island initiated the BOS 
contract, DOL wage rates were approximately one-third lower than the prevailing local 
wage for similar functions. Contractor bids were based on DOL wages, which made it 
difficult for the contractors. to attract quality workers. The poor quality of workers 
ultimately led to some of the performance problems that affected the contractors. (Tighe, 
1997) 
Another area that affected the outcome at Parris Island was the use of sealed-bid 
contract process. This process limited the command to accepting the lowest bid for the 
BOS contract. The command did not have the ability to use contractor past performance 
when evaluating the bids. This limited the ability of the command to effectively screen 
out unqualified bidders. In effect, "you get what you pay for". (Tighe, 1997) 
The Parris Island case is an example of a negative experience with outsourcing. 
However, there are valuable lessons to be learned that can be beneficial to 
MARFORP AC. This case demonstrates that there is a learning curve for the government. 
The first BOS contract relied on poorly written performance work statements. Parris 
Island learned from this experience and provided a more complete PWS for the second 
BOS contract. The second BOS contract also included penalties for non-compliance. 
Another aspect of this case is that bundling many functions into a single multifunction 
BOS contract can lead to problems if all the functions do not fit well together. The case 
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also points out the importance of good negotiations when it comes to contractors utilizing 
government-owned facilities. The negotiations must be detailed enough to indicate 
responsibility for upkeep and maintenance of these facilities. 
4. U.S. Army Outsourcing 
The U.S. Army has conducted outsourcing competitions for multifunction 
contracts that also provide learning· opportunities for the Marine Corps and 
MARFORPAC. 
Fort Eustis, Virginia is a command that falls under the Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). A multifunction competition was conducted for 
services that included laundry, food services, supply, transportation and maintenance. 
The command at Fort Eustis was pleased with the performance of the contractor, which 
has been in effect since 1982. Initially, there was some cost growth associated with the 
contract, that has been attributed to the DOL wage rate increases and changes in the scope 
of work. Since these initial cost increases, changes to the scope of work have been 
carefully documented and costs for the contract are declining. The command is extremely 
pleased with the flexibility shown by the contractor. They believe that the contractor is 
able to cope with changes better than the original in-house team. (Tighe, 1997) 
A key component in this contract is the working relationship that the contractor 
and the command share. This has provided many benefits to the command. One is the 
responsiveness of the contractor. An example cited was the surge operations during 
Desert Shield/Storm, that required the repainting of more than 1,000 vehicles. This task 
was completed on time and within scope because the contractor was able to quickly adapt 
and expand the workforce to meet the increased workload. This relationship has allowed 
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the command and contractor to informally discuss changes and agree upon a mutually 
beneficial solution. (Tighe, 1997) 
Another positive aspect is that the quality assurance (QA) plan used is realistic. 
The quality of contractor performance is based on realistic goals, and the command uses 
an award fee contract as an incentive to ensure good performance. In contrast, another 
unidentified installation under TRADOC experienced negative results with a similar 
contract with the same contractor. This was attributed to an unrealistic QA plan that 
required contractor performance to be superior to the "before study" in-house 
performance. (Tighe, 1997) , 
5. Lessons Learned/Summary 
These cases represent a small portion of outsourcing experiences within'DoD. 
Many lessons learned are unique to the individual case. Some of the lessons learned are 
similar to all. CNA reported that in almost every case there was a learning curve 
associated with the outsourcing process that resulted in an initial decrease in productivity. 
The learning curve tends to be steeper when the PWS is not complete. (Tighe, 1997) The 
most successful outsourcing efforts resulted when performance-based contracts were 
utilized with some type of award fee. Grouping similar functions into a multifunction 
study resulted in greater savings than competing single functions. Finally, employee 
morale may be affected during the process and the longer the A-76 process takes, the 
greater the impact. 
These lessons learned can be beneficial to any command undertaking the A-76 
process. The next section will, analyze these lessons learned. 
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C. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
Outsourcing remains the vehicle for DoD to reduce costs and inefficiency. To 
adequately understand how the competition associated with outsourcing can be beneficial, 
the limits of the process must be explored. 
1. Learning Curves 
Basic learning curve theory states that a worker learns as he or she works, and the 
more often the same operation is repeated, efficiency will increase. The Navy 
experienced this phenomenon when outsourcing T A-4 maintenance. Understanding 
learning curve theory will benefit the command when determining which functions to 
outsource. The more technically intensive the function, the more time it will take to over 
come the learning curve. 
The Parris Island case indicates that learning also occurs on the part of the 
installation. This case demonstrates how poorly written PWSs can negatively impact the 
outcome. The negative impacts tend to last the length of the first contract. 
For a contractor to win the bidding process, the winning bid must be 10 percent 
lower than the in-house bid. This 10 percent margin is designed in part to account for the 
short term disruptions that may occur as a result of changing service providers. (KettI, 
1993) In the Navy case, the short-term disruption lasted over two years before an 
improvement was recorded. A steep learning curve that is the result of poor PWSs will 
increase the risks for the government. While all risks can't be controlled, the government 
must do all it can to mitigate them. 
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2. Poor PWS Development 
Development of the PWS is critical to the A-76 process. As indicated in Chapter 
II, having in-house employees develop the PWS is disruptive and leads to decreased 
productivity. Poorly written PWSs result in cost escalation as the scope of work is 
changed to reflect the work that is required of the contractor. 
Within DoD today, many commands are faced with not having the knowledge 
base to conduct effective outsourcing competitions. This is the case partly because many 
of the individuals who had the requisite knowledge have left government employment. 
This will increase the risk for the command initiating the A-76 process. 
The potential savings associated with outsourcing can quickly be reduced as a 
result of a poorly written PWS. To prevent cost escalation, commands must design the 
PWS to effectively capture the essence of the function considered for outsourcing. A 
PWS for a simple task should be very specific so there is no question as to what is 
expected from the contractor. For more complex functions, the PWS should be written 
to identify outcomes desired by the government without telling the contractor how to 
complete the task. A well-defined PWS is the key to meeting the requirements for 
effective performance and preventing excessive contract modifications and unanticipated 
cost increases. 
3. Contract Type 
The type of contract that is awarded can also impact the success of the outsourcing 
effort. The cases outlined above indicate that using negotiated competitions that take into 
account bidder past performance can· increase the likelihood of success. The Parris 
Island case provides an example of the downside of the sealed-bid process. The 
42 
following discussion will look at the different types of contracts that are typically used in 
the outsourcing process. 
a) Firm-Fixed Price Contract 
As the name implies, a firm-fixed price contract provides a contract with a 
price that is fixed for the life of the contract and is not subject to any adjustment relative 
to the costs incurred by the contractor. The contractor accepts all the risk while the 
government does not share in any of the risk. Profit for the contractor is directly related 
to the cost of doing the work: In other words, how effectively the contractor controls cost 
and manages the contract will determine the amount of profit. (Hearn, 1996) 
Under this type of contract, the government relies on competition and 
profit motive to motivate the contractor to be efficient and make accurate decisions 
regarding contract fulfillment (Thompson and Jones, 1~94). Fixed price contracts have 
been used in instances where the service provided was labor intensive arid contracting 
officials and bidders could accurately estimate costs. 
b) Cost-Type Contracts 
This type of contract utilizes cost reimbursement. The government agrees 
to reimburse the contractor for all allowable and allocable costs incurred in the execution 
of the contract. This type of contract places more risk on the government in terms of 
escalating costs. (Hearn, 1996) 
c) Award-Fee Contracts 
The award fee can be used in either type contract. It is typically used in 
the cost-type contract. The award is used as an incentive to encourage maximum 
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contractor performance. It is used to provide incentives in areas such as timeliness, 
quality and cost effectiveness. It is awarded based on the government's subjective 
determination of the contractor performance. (Hearn, 1996) 
The award-fee type contract has proved beneficial to commands as a 
means for containing or reducing costs. The award provides the command with a means 
to focus the contractor on feedback from the recipients of the service and can result in 
better responsiveness from the contractor. (GAO, 98-82) 
4. Contract Monitoring 
Regardless of the type of contract used in the outsourcing process, the 
performance of the contractor will have to be monitored. Monitoring of the contract 
should be preventive not punitive. The intent is to determine whether discrepancies exist 
between the provisions of the contract and actual results. (Prager, 1994) The firm-fixed 
price contract requires less administrative overhead than the cost-type contracts. 
Monitoring contracts incurs additional costs to the government, but the costs of not 
monitoring can be even greater. 
Monitoring contracts where the contractor has more opportunities to defraud the 
government is more critical. In the case of the cost-type contract, the government must 
approve the costs submitted. This requires a knowledgeable staff and can lead to 
creation. of a separate bureaucracy for contract monitoring. As the requirements for 
effective monitoring increase, so do the costs. The costs associated with monitoring the 
outsourcing contract can exceed the costs of producing the service in-house, thereby 
reducing savings. (Prager, 1994) 
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Contracts with the private sector require monitoring to ensure that the government 
is provided the service or product it has purchased. The costs of monitoring must be 
considered when analyzing the costs of outsourcing. 
5. Best Value Criteria 
Best value refers to the process of selecting the most advantageous offer to the 
government by evaluating and comparing factors in addition to price and cost. It· allows 
the government to choose the superior bid even if it means paying a higher price. The use 
of best value criteria also allows the contracting agency to avoid selecting the lowest 
bidder if they believe that the lowest bidder is not capable of effectively executing the 
contract. Best value criteria are considered appropriate when the functions assessed for 
outsourcing are complex, require technical expertise and where there is a high level of 
risk involved. 
Experience has shown that the low bidder will tend to focus more on profit and 
quality may be sacrificed. As indicated in the Parris Island case, this situation can be 
costly to the government when contracts have to be modified or a new contractor has to 
be found as a result of contractor failure. 
6. Bundling of Functions 
Grouping similar functions together into a single, omnibus contract has produced 
benefits. The benefits include 1) a single manager is held responsible for performance; 2) 
greater opportunities exist for efficiencies; 3) increased flexibility for contract change; 
and 4) reduced cost and effort involved in developing and awarding a single contract. 
(GAO,97-86) 
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Bundling of functions also provides the contractor flexibility to utilize the same 
employees across functions. This leads to increased efficiencies that help to contain costs 
over the long term. 
Omnibus contacts are not without drawbacks. The contract can become 
cumbersome to manage effectively. The lack of expertise in all areas of the contract of 
those responsible for oversight can also lead to problems. Degraded quality in some 
functions can lead to problems affecting other areas. Also, when sub-contractors have a 
dispute with each other, functions can be put at risk that affect the mission 
accomplishment of the installation. 
The potential for problems with omnibus contracts cannot be overlooked when 
contemplating outsourcing. The decision to bundle functions must be weighed carefully 
against the potential for problems, and the requirement for a knowledgeable staff to 
monitor performance. 
7. Employee Morale 
The outsourcing process creates problems for the employees and managers in the 
areas considered. As previously stated, once the announcement has been made to conduct 
an A-76 study, productivity may decline. The A-76 process is perceived as putting jobs at 
risk. Many employees transfer to other federal jobs. Key to successful completion of the 
outsourcing competition is communication. 
Senior leadership from the installation must be involved from the beginning and 
support the process. This commitment sets the tone for the rest of the command. 
Adhering to the time frame in OMB Circular A-76 will also reduce moral problems. As 
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indicated in the Parris Island case, the longer the competition process lasts, the greater the 
potential for problems. 
The command must communicate with its employees. Regardless of who wins 
the competition, the probability exists that some jobs will be lost. Informing employees 
of this possibility and assisting with a transition program can enhance employee morale. 
(Tighe, 1997) 
The challenges associated with outsourcing also affect labor unions that represent 
federal employees. While unions generally do not support outsourcing, they realize that 
the A-76 process has been used as a means to reduce costs. Communicating with the 
employees and unions will provide the. necessary information that will assist those 
affected by outsourcing to make more intelligent career decision. (Tighe, 1997) 
D. SUMMARY 
DoD has many experiences with outsourcing. Lessons learned from experience 
can be applied to the USMC outsourcing process that will prevent problems from 
occurring. 
Understanding that there is a learning curve associated with the process will 
strengthen the government's ability to effectively estimate costs. Having accurate 
performance work statements will impact not only on the learning curve, but the 
contracting process as well. The more accurate the PWS, the greater the probability that 
problems will be decreased. The type of contract that is used is dependent upon the 
situation. If the function(s) to be outsourced are routine and manpower intensive, a firm-
fixed price contract may be preferred. Functions that require changes in the workload or 
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cannot be adequately defined in the PWS are better suited for a cost-type contract. 
Utilization of an award fee contract has proved beneficial as an incentive to motivate the 
contractor. Best value criteria are key to successful contracting. The government must 
take into account previous performance of the potential contractors. Employee morale 
will be affected during the outsourcing process. Communicating with the employees and 
labor unions can produce a positive relationship that will enable a smoother transition 
regardless of who wins the competition process. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
DoD has renewed its emphasis on outsourcing as a means for reducing costs and 
achieving savings that can be applied to modernization and procurement. The Marine 
Corps has been assigned its share of savings and, in turn, has charged commanders with 
meeting targeted savings goats. OMB Circular A-76 is the primary tool to be used to 
achieve these savings. MARFORP AC has developed and is in the process of 
implementing the Cost Reduction Initiative. The CRI is a long-term plan designed to 
meet the mandated savings through outsourcing and culture change. 
In the current environment of fiscal constraint, outsourcing is viewed as a means 
to meet the QDR recommendation of $60 billion in savings. Outsourcing of functions 
also is intended to cause the services to focus on core competencies to meet national 
security needs. 
Benefits of outsourcing are identified as: 1) competition associated with 
outsourcing results in efficiencies; and 2) substantial cost savings will result from 
competition between and within the public and private sector. 
Concerns with outsourcing voiced by opponents are: 1) projected savings may be 
overstated; 2) fraud and abuse may result from contracting out services; and 3) cultural 
resistance to change is difficult to overcome and this may impede outsourcing 
implementation. 
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A detailed description of the MARFORPAC CRI was provided. This included a 
discussion of the organization and the measures that are intended to be used at the 
overseas installations that cannot utilize OMB Circular A-76. 
Finally, a review and analysis of lessons learned from actual contracting out 
resulted in the following conclusions: 1) there is a learning curve associated with 
outsourcing that may affect productivity; 2) an incomplete PWS will impact negatively 
the learning curve and the contracting effort; 3) the most successful outsourcing efforts 
resulted form the use of perf~rmance-based contracts; 4) the use of an award fee provided 
additional incentives to motivate the contractor to reduce or control costs; 5) bundling 
functions into a multifunctional study results in greater savings than serveral single 
function studies and contracts; and 6) employee morale may be adversely affected the 
longer the A-76 process takes to complete. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine outsourcing and the 
MARFORP AC cost reduction initiative. The following sections answer the research 
questions posed in Chapter I and then provide some concluding recommendations and 
observations. 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research questions are: (a) What is the Marine Corps policy on 
outsourcing? (b) What are the lessons learned from commands that have completed the 
outsourcing process? (c) Is the strategy developed by the Commander, Marine Forces 
Pacific adequate to achieve the savings identified by HQMC? 
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Outsourcing in the Marine Corps is a tool in the revolution in business affairs 
designed to transform the culture in the Marine Corps to achieve the most efficient and 
effective organization. The A-76 process will be utilized to compete all commercial 
activities. All civilian and uniformed Marine service structure will be included in this 
process. Any Marine billet contracted out will be reduced from the end strength of the 
Marine Corps. The installation commander is tasked to determine which commercial 
activities to compete, based upon local considerations. 
The ·lessons learned from other DoD outsourcing experiences were highlighted 
previously. The most important is the development of an accurate performance work 
statement. The PWS is the key to the process and will impact directly upon the success 
of the outsourcing effort. The more accurate the PWS, the fewer problems encountered 
by both government and contractors. 
As of the publication of this thesis, it is too early to determine whether the CRI 
will result in the savings projected. Funds have been reduced from the O&MMC budgets 
of the MSCs for the out-years. The MSCs are currently determining which functions to 
outsource and the best ways to meet the specific savings allocated to them. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Definition of Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is the transfer of functions that are traditionally done in-house to the 
private sector. This is typically accomplished through the use of the OMB Circular A-76 
process. Outsourcing is based on the assumptions that (a) the government operates as a 
monopolist and is therefore inefficient, and (b) the private sector is inherently more 
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efficient because of competition in the market. The savings associated with outsourcing 
are the result of the competition between and/or within the public and private sectors. 
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Outsourcing 
The benefits and concerns with outsourcing are noted above. Clearly, the greatest 
strength associated with outsourcing is the potential savings that result from reduced costs 
and increased efficiencies. Savings estimates range from 20 to 40 percent for commercial 
activities that involve civilian employees. When considering active duty military, the 
savings may be as high as 50 percent. These lucrative potential savings are one reason 
that DoD has renewed its emphasis on outsourcing as a means to modernize the force. 
Associated with the potential savings is the concern that the estimated savings are 
overstated and will not be achieved. The services and mildeps are not required to 
maintain records of costs past three years. Based upon past experience, costs will 
continue to grow over time and anticipated savings will decrease. Past experience within 
DoD indicate that estimated savings associated with other reform initiatives have not 
been realized. The impact of personnel reductions, both civilian and military, may also 
affect the amount of savings realized. As the size of DoD shrinks, personnel that remain 
must become more efficient. to accomplish the same tasks to support the force. The 
savings that are anticipated may become harder to achieve as organizations approach their 
most efficient level. 
3. The Need for Outsourcing in the Marine Corps and MARFORPAC 
To meet the demands of the 21 st century, DoD must find ways to meet the 
expected $30 to $60 billion shortfall in modernization and procurement. The Marine 
Corps has had to sustain its operations and maintenance funding at the expense of 
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procurement and modernization. The challenge facing the Marine Corps is modernizing 
aging weapons systems and facilities in an era of reduced resource availability. The 
Marine Corps anticipates saving $215 million between FY 2000 to FY 2003 and $110 
million thereafter through outsourcing. These savings are to be applied to modernization. 
MARFORP AC has been assigned its share of the savings wedge. Between FY 
2000 to FY 2005, MARFORPAC will "contribute" $150 million towards the Marine 
Corps wedge. MARFORP AC developed the CRI as a means to realize these savings and 
revolutionize the way busine~s is conducted. The CRI encompasses both the supporting 
establishment and the operating forces in this effort. 
4. Issues Affecting MARFORPAC 
MARFORP AC is faced with implementing and sustaining a program with 
minimal technical expertise. Re-engineering business consultantation provided by 
NA VFAC will assist the installation commander in implementation. The initial absence 
of sufficient personnel trained in the outsourcing area may adversely impact 
implementation. Integration of lessons learned in the initial outsourcing effort will be 
crucial for subsequent efforts. 
Development of accurate performance work statements will affect this process. 
An improperly conceived PWS may be detrimental to the success of the local effort to 
implement the CRI. Relying on civilian employees to develop the PWS may be the only 
option available, but this poses potential risks to the Corps in terms of sustaining mission 
capability that must be managed. 
Determining whether to bundle functions into a single study and contract or 
conduct numerous single studies and let multiple contracts will affect the amount of 
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savings that can be achieved. Each installation and outsourcing effort is unique and 
these decisions must be reached at the local level. Having some installations utilize a 
BOS type contract and others utilize single contracts will affect the overall savings that 
MARFORPAC will realize. 
Another issue is the implication of reducing the civilian workforce. An effective 
program, in line with any union agreement, to inform employees of impending 
outsourcing initiatives will be beneficial. Adhering to the goal of using normal attrition 
and placement programs will minimize adverse impacts from job loss. 
Another issue that will effect MARFORP AC is determining the type of contract to 
issue. Using a fixed price or cost plus contract depends on the type of function(s) to be 
competed. Most functions associated with base support can be bid on a fixed price 
contract because they are well defined. The use of the award fee approach provides an 
incentive to the contractor to control costs. However, the use of an award fee creates 
additional overhead costs to the government in the form of oversight costs. 
5. Impacts of Outsourcing on MARFORPAC 
When the installation commander announces an A-76 study, there may be an 
initial decrease in the· productivity of civilian employees. This may occur due to the 
uncertain future that faces the employees, and must be anticipated by the command. 
D. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ON OUTSOURCING 
Including military manpower in outsourcing studies may have unforeseen 
consequences for MARFORP AC. The stated policy is to compete Marine billets and to 
reduce end strength if the billet is outsourced. Many of the billets that will be considered 
54 
are typically considered non-Fleet Marine Force (FMF) billets. Some non-FMF billets 
are used to keep Marines proficient in their MOS without having to deploy. A reduction 
in the number of non-FMF billets will mean a corresponding increase in the amount of 
time that a Marine spends in the FMF. The downside to this is the possibility that morale 
may be adversely affected as a result of an increase in operations and personnel tempo. 
Politically, all this places the Marine Corps in a difficult position. The 
Commandant and his predecessors have lobbied extensively to keep the end strength of 
the Marine Corps stable. Congress and the QDR have agreed with this position. If the 
Marine Corps would be willing to reduce military end strength as a result of outsourcing, 
this could adversely affect Marine Corps credibility. 
To compensate for the problem, in November 1998, HQMC removed military 
manpower from the outsourcing process. This change will require that the assigned 
savings be obtained from conducting A-76 studies involving the civilian workforce. This 
creates new challenges for MARFORP AC, as more emphasis will have to be placed on 
savings from process improvements. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
Outsourcing is currently viewed as one remedy to reduce the costs associated with 
opeating the DoD infrastructure. Outsourcing alone cannot provide the cost savings and 
efficiencies required. However, the competition associated with outsourcing is the means 
by which the government may obtain cheaper services and increased efficiency. It 
appears to be a step in the right direction in adopting better business practices. 
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Experiences from previous outsourcing efforts indicates that the process can be 






Develop accurate performance work statements that reflect the essence of the 
function without providing specific details on how to accomplish the task. 
To the extent possible, utilize multifunction studies that incorporate similar 
functions or allow for the use of employees across functions. 
Utilize best value criteria when selecting a contractor. 
Ensure that command commitment is promulgated and maintained during 
transitions of commanders. 
• Communicate with employees and their unions from the start of the process 
and establish an effective transition plan for in-house workers. 
The MARFORPAC CRI is a broad-based approach to achieving the savings 
required to meet modernization needs. The future success of the CRI will, in part, be 
based on the political and fiscal environment ofthe 21 st century. ·MARFORPAC has set 
the standard for the Marine Corps and has developed a plan that can be altered to meet 
changing fiscal constraints. 
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis examined outsourcing and the MARFORPAC Cost Reduction 
Initiative. Additional research is required on implementation problems and lessons 
learned from the various MSCs. Fiscal data are needed to determine to what extent the 
savings projected have been met and whether and how the reduced O&MMC budget 
affects the readiness of the Marine Corps. 
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